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Workers without Rights1  
Paul Gomberg 
 
Abstract: In the United States the Civil Rights Movement emerging after World 
War II ended Jim Crow racism, with its legal segregation and stigmatization of 
black people. Yet black people, both in chattel slavery and under Jim Crow, had 
provided abundant labor subject to racist terror; they were workers who could 
be recruited for work others were unwilling to do. What was to replace this 
labor, which had been the source of so much wealth and power? Three federal 
initiatives helped to create new workers without rights: the welfare reform law 
of 1996 and the changes in immigration and crime law and policy both starting 
in the mid-1960s. These changes re-created vulnerable labor, 
disproportionately marked and stigmatized as black or Mexican. These workers 
create a central strength of U.S. imperialism: cheap food. Because workers 
without rights have an important function in a capitalist economy, a society 
where all workers can flourish is not capitalist but communist. 
Keywords: capitalism, communism, function, labor, mass incarceration, racial 
injustice, racism, undocumented immigration, welfare reform, workers. 
 
In the aftermath of the limited successes of the Civil Rights Movement in the 
United States it was no longer acceptable openly to treat black people by a double 
standard. The double standards that had been part of U.S. history – racial slavery 
and then Jim Crow – had provided the U.S. with abundant cheap and flexible 
labor, people who (as a consequence of force or terror) worked under conditions 
others would not accept. This essay tells the story of how the United States 
government created a new system of racial injustice to replace Jim Crow racism, 
creating again workers without rights.  
By ‘workers without rights’ I do not mean workers lacking legal rights. 
Rather I mean workers who are so vulnerable that their bosses know they are 
unlikely to assert any legal rights they may have. Consider these (hypothetical 
but realistic) examples: (1) A twenty-two year old black single mother of two 
young children, their sole support, works in a chicken processing plant in central 
                                                        
1 This essay arose from conversations with my daughter Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz eight years 
ago. Based on my teaching about penal servitude in the South after the Civil War, I had 
remarked that the penal system now was used to discipline labor; she replied that the 
illegalization of immigrants created a similar and parallel discipline (she is a scholar of 
immigration). Her essay emerging from these conversations is Gomberg-Muñoz 2012. I thank 
her for stimulating me to think about these connections. I also thank Joseph Luders, who was 
discussant at a session including a draft of this paper at the Midwest Political Science 
Association in 2014 and Stephen Engelmann, who organized a colloquium on a draft in the 
spring of 2015 at University of Illinois at Chicago. Justin Holt, Carol Caref, Sheldon Jones, Ruth 
Gomberg-Muñoz, and Mary Gomberg gave very helpful criticism of earlier drafts. 
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Mississippi, her paycheck paying rent that keeps her family from homelessness. 
From repetitive motions at work she has developed carpal tunnel so painful that 
she cannot sleep at night without soaking her arms in cold water in the sink at 
bedtime to numb the pain; when the pain awakens her during the night she 
soaks them again. When she goes to the company doctor, he tells her to go back 
to work. So she just endures the pain. Eventually she expects to become disabled 
from the injury and to try to get on disability relief, as her mother was able to do. 
(2) An undocumented Mexican immigrant works at a large club stocking the bar 
with beer, wine and liquor. During a snowstorm the managers become 
concerned about the accumulation of snow on the roof; they ask him to shovel 
the snow off the roof. He complies. Later that evening someone gets sick in the 
men’s restroom; the managers ask him to go in and clean the vomit and feces. He 
complies. There are no work rules at this club; undocumented workers are 
recruited for any task that needs to be done and that no one else wants to do. 
They do not feel as if they can refuse. (3) A black ex-felon who had been 
convicted of selling small amounts of marijuana at work on an earlier job (the 
income supplementing his low pay) has been hired to work at a fast food 
restaurant. At the end of his shift the clean-up of the restaurant is still not 
complete. The manager tells him to clock out and continue working to clean the 
restaurant. When he complains, the manager replies, “I did you a favor giving 
you a job; now I need a favor.” The worker complies. 
In the first case the combination of changes in the welfare law, the absence 
of her children’s father (who is in prison), and the complicity between her 
employer and state officials leave the worker with little choice but to endure the 
pain until she is permanently disabled. In the third case the bosses’ demand is 
actually illegal, but the worker, being vulnerable, went along. In the second case 
the worker, subject to deportation, will not assert a right to limit his labor to the 
task he was hired to do, a right that is routine where workers have union 
protection. In all three cases their bosses know that the workers are unlikely or 
unable to assert their rights. Effectively they are workers without rights. 
So this essay tells the story of how racial injustice was recreated by the 
United States government and replaced the system of Jim Crow racism. For those 
of us who seek a society without racial injustice – or any comparable injustice – 
the lessons of the replacement are important: a society without racial injustice 
will require deep social change.  
Function and Social Change  
Vulnerable workers and high unemployment are functional in capitalist society. 
To say that vulnerable labor is functional in capitalist society is to say that under 
conditions of competition between firms, all else being equal, firms operating in 
a society where many workers lack rights have an advantage in competition with 
firms operating in societies where workers have greater rights. Capitalism 
requires that firms make profits from their operations in competition with other 
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businesses. Doing business cheaply gives a competitive advantage, and it’s 
cheaper to do business with labor that will work hard, flexibly, and efficiently for 
lower wages than competitors. When a worker is vulnerable, she is more likely 
to work hard for low wages and comply with employers’ requests. So the 
presence of low-wage pliable labor enhances a firm’s profits. As a result a society 
where workers are vulnerable creates – for firms operating there – a profit 
advantage over firms located in societies where workers are less vulnerable. In 
that sense vulnerability has a function in a capitalist society. 
Saying that something is functional does not substitute for a historical 
narrative of how it came about. (Elsewhere2 I have developed a narrative of the 
creation and re-creation of low-wage pliable labor in what became the United 
States from its settlement by the English to the 1960s; those most deeply and 
directly affected were identified as ‘black,’ but, given labor competition, others 
whose labor competed with black labor were also held down.) Yet awareness of 
function is useful to those who seek social change. Processes of development 
take place within limits. Capitalist society creates limits to what is at all likely to 
exist within it – for example, a class of laborers all of whom flourish, whose 
needs are met for engaging labor, security, stimulating cultural and educational 
opportunities, and for housing and a physical environment that are healthy, 
comfortable, and lift our spirits. Such a class is unlikely to exist in competitive 
capitalism because the cost of goods and services created by workers who are so 
well off would generally be higher than goods and services created by others 
who were worse off. So vulnerable labor is functional in capitalism; it represents 
what is likely to exist, and we search for narrative explanation of how it arose.  
It is important to recognize function if we want to bring about social 
change. We may protest unjust treatment of vulnerable workers or policies 
which create vulnerability. But it is functional for capitalism to have vulnerable 
workers; so when one form of injustice is protested and ended, another form of 
injustice replaces it. The injustice done historically to black workers from early 
Virginia through the period of Jim Crow is replaced by injustice in a new form. 
Creating a society where all workers can flourish requires us to eliminate 
capitalist society. 
In this essay we see how, in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement, 
the role that black labor had historically played was recreated for black workers 
and others. What role had black labor played? At the beginning of the Civil War 
cotton was the U.S.’s leading export crop, and slave-produced plantation crops 
were the source of two-thirds of U.S. export income. It is no exaggeration to say 
that black slave labor was the key to U.S. wealth and its rise as a capitalist power 
(Baptist 2014). After the Civil War black sharecroppers (and white as well – 45% 
of southern sharecroppers in 1940 were not black) continued to produce 
                                                        
2 In the book manuscript American Racial Injustice: How It Arose, Why It Persists, How It May 
End. The present essay is based on a chapter from that manuscript. 
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immense wealth (and the conditions of white sharecroppers were limited by the 
extreme exploitation of black sharecroppers). Migrant black (and other) farm 
workers moved from Florida to New England seasonally harvesting fruit and 
vegetable crops and processing these crops for freezing and canning (Thomas-
Lycklama a Nijeholt 1980). In cities black workers assumed increasing 
prominence in basic industry, including meatpacking. By the late 1950s nearly 
75% of the workers in Chicago’s meatpacking industry were black (Halpern and 
Horowitz 1996, 29). By the 1960s and 70s black workers were important to the 
labor force in automobile and steel industries, especially in the Midwest and in 
California, but often in the hardest and lowest paying positions. Black workers, 
especially women, cleaned up and cared for children and the elderly. Black 
workers were central to the U.S. labor force. The work that black workers have 
done historically has to be done by someone, and much of the U.S. economy has 
depended on black labor. (Others besides black workers also toiled under 
inferior conditions and were exploited and oppressed more severely than white 
male workers: Mexican braceros [migrant farm workers deported when their 
labor was not needed], Chinese and indigenous labor in the West, many 
immigrants, women, and children.) The Civil Rights Movement demanded that 
black workers have the same rights as others. To whatever degree this demand 
was met, racial injustice was not ended but transformed.  
The Relative Decline of the United States  
To understand that transformation we need to review social conditions in the 
United States at the end of the 1960s through the 1970s. Starting with the 
Harlem uprising of 1964 and the large Watts rising of 1965, major cities erupted 
in rebellion. Campuses, predominately white and predominately black as well, 
were centers of antiwar activity. Workers were striking to hold on to their 
standard of living as inflation increased. Rebellions on the shop floor, sabotage, 
and absenteeism at work made it hard for employers to discipline their workers. 
Moreover, the United States was no longer the undisputed ‘top dog’ of the 
capitalist world. Other capitalist powers challenged U.S. economic hegemony – 
the Soviet Union challenged the U.S. militarily, supplied more energy to Europe, 
and sponsored movements to remove former colonies from the Euro-American 
sphere while Japan and Germany were making inroads on world markets 
including the U.S. auto market. New smaller producers – Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, 
Philippines – were beginning to build their own steel (and, in the case of Korea, 
auto) industries. (More recently China has emerged as a major and fast-growing 
capitalist economy.) This beginning of U.S. decline relative to other nations 
whose economies were growing much faster set limits to what could be 
conceded to civil rights struggles.  
Intensifying international competition had other effects. To produce 
cheaply capitalists renewed their capital, replacing older technology with new, 
increasing efficiency. Relative shortages of labor also encouraged renewal of 
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capital as did the capitalists’ need to weaken labor’s position by creating surplus 
labor. Labor shortages led workers to quit when the job became too unpleasant 
or the wages too low (there were other jobs); shortages also made it easier to 
strike for higher wages and other benefits. The U.S. had some peculiar 
disadvantages: while at the end of World War II its capital stock was far more 
productive than others’, by the end of the 1960s other capitalist countries were 
beginning to match and eventually surpass U.S. productivity. So the U.S. was in 
relative decline. Worker safety and environmental protection legislation also 
increased manufacturing costs. Increased competition and higher capital costs 
led to declines in profit rates (Armstrong et al. 1991; cf. Brenner 2006, Parenti 
1999, Perelman 2002, Glyn 2006, Arrighi 2003, Bowles et al. 1990 for similar 
arguments).  
By the mid-1970s international competition, a sharp hike in oil prices in 
1974, the decline in profit rate, and high wage settlements combined to create 
‘stagflation,’ a high inflation rate combined with a stagnating economy and 
growing unemployment (hence an end to labor shortages, partly caused by the 
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam). These factors put great pressure on capitalists to 
go on the offensive against workers to lower their labor costs, making it cheaper 
to operate a business in the U.S. They did this by lowering what they spent on 
wages and benefits, as well as worker safety and environmental protection, 
which also add to production costs. This happened with a vengeance in the 
‘Reagan revolution,’ but it started with Jimmy Carter’s appointment of Paul 
Volcker to chair the Federal Reserve Board. In 1981 Volcker raised interest rates 
to several points higher than the inflation rate to induce a recession (which 
occurred), raise unemployment (which reached 10% in 1982), and reduce the 
power of workers. To give a sense of some consequences: between 1965 and 
1979 in the United States on average 1,520,000 workers each year were involved 
in work stoppages of more than 1,000 workers; between 2000 and 2014 the 
average was 111, 870 per year, a drop of over 90% (United States Department of 
Labor 2016, Table 1). As unemployment rose and strikes fell, bosses threatened 
to move jobs overseas or out-of-state. Some moved to rural areas in the North or 
to the South, others to Mexico (Ford is an important example) or to Asia 
(virtually all electronics production); rural areas, the South and non-U.S. 
destinations had advantages for the capitalists: no labor unions, lower wages, 
few or no benefits, lower taxes, and few or no environmental or safety 
protections. Actual or threatened moves intensified workers’ fears; they made 
concessions to try to ‘keep their jobs’ (which often were eliminated anyway). 
Volcker’s medicine was combined with Reagan’s breaking of the strike by the 
nation’s air traffic controllers in 1981; this action signaled open season for 
management on unions. As a result of all of these attacks, unionization of 
workers in the private sector has dropped now to 7% from a high of over 30% in 
the 1950s (Mayer 2004).  
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All of this worked – up to a point. Depressing wages and intimidating 
workers helped capitalists to survive. But the fundamental problems were not 
solved: the international economy is very competitive; wage concessions in one 
company, industry, or country lead to wage concessions in others as workers 
compete for jobs in a ‘race to the bottom.’ The U.S. is still in decline relative to 
other powers, particularly China; the rate of profit remains lower.  
The Recreation of State-Centered Racial Injustice  
The policy changes to be described in this essay should be understood in the 
context of this general attack on workers (which continues to this day). The 
historical role played by black labor and labor of children, women, and 
immigrants has come to be filled by workers without rights: women who work in 
exchange for an assistance check from the state (workfare and similar programs) 
or under the threat or reality of being cut off from assistance, undocumented 
immigrants, and people under the control of the penal system – or with a felony 
conviction.  
These groups act as an anchor limiting what other workers are likely to 
achieve. For example, a woman whose husband (or father of her children) is in 
jail or prison is limited in her options; this makes her more desperate for work 
under any conditions that may be offered. Others who may be slightly less 
desperate must compete in the labor market with the most desperate and 
disadvantaged workers. This competition for jobs tends to drive down the 
conditions of all workers.  
What replaced Jim Crow racism in the aftermath of civil rights? The crucial 
changes occurred primarily at the federal level, starting in the 1970s, but some 
of the political and legal groundwork had been laid in the 1960s. I review three 
major changes in policy. First, the welfare program Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC, earlier ADC) was replaced by Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) in legislation passed in 1996; aid was limited to five 
years, and after two years of aid further aid was contingent on adult 
participation in labor. Second, immigrant workers became undocumented; new 
numerical quotas on immigration, particularly from Mexico, were imposed just 
as a massive U.S. – Mexico guest worker program ended while economic changes 
there were cutting wages and forcing people off the land, leading to more 
immigration. So immigration was increasing from areas where workers had little 
access to visas. Third, by the mid-2000s the rate of incarceration in the U.S. was 
five times the rate of the early 1970s; nearly 40% of those incarcerated are black, 
and 60% are either black or latino. Black people are incarcerated at a rate five 
times the rate at which non-Hispanic white people are incarcerated. As I will 
explain below the net effect of these three changes in policies adopted by federal 
and state governments is that the category of workers without rights has been 
reconstituted based on state-centered racial injustice.  
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What unites these programs is their effect on workers seeking jobs or 
currently employed. None was advertised as a program to create cheap, 
malleable, and vulnerable workers. Welfare reform was supposedly intended to 
reduce welfare-dependency and give mothers pride as workers. Immigration 
reform was said to take control of the border with Mexico and penalize 
employers for hiring undocumented workers. The changes in policy that led to 
mass incarceration were alleged to stop drugs, battle gangs, and limit street 
crime. But the effect of all of these has been to create tens of millions of workers 
without rights.  
Welfare Reform  
TANF replaced AFDC in 1996 federal legislation. TANF limits lifetime assistance 
to 60 months or five years and limits assistance to two years unless adults work 
(these are the federal guidelines; states develop particular programs within the 
guidelines). Shepherded through Congress by Bill Clinton, the justification of the 
change had been prepared years earlier by theories – propounded by Arthur 
Jensen, Richard Herrnstein, Patrick Moynihan, Edward Banfield and others – that 
poor people in general and black people in particular were genetically inferior or 
culturally deficient. Newspapers and television news were filled with stories 
about the dysfunctional ‘underclass’ harmed by crack addiction and government 
dependency, the latter theme championed also by Charles Murray (1984). 
Politicians, for example Nixon, embraced some of these ideas, and their 
campaigns popularized them. The ideas gradually gained hold, in one form or 
another, among both white and black people, setting the stage for the 1996 
legislation.  
The important point is the effect of the legislation. As long as welfare and 
other forms of public assistance existed, workers had alternatives to work under 
the most exploitative and degrading conditions, a ‘back-up’ in the form of public 
aid. Removing that ‘back-up’ forces people into the labor market in desperation; 
they accept whatever is offered. Since there were no or inadequate provisions 
for child care under the new law, the law created additional strain usually on 
relatives who had to watch the children of people who were working (my 
students at Chicago State University often had to look after the children of a 
parent, sister, or cousin while the mother went to work, thus missing class). The 
reform added to the pool of workers without alternatives, thus creating 
additional workers with limited rights to say no.  
To get a measure of the problems people face, consider the 1997 study 
Making Ends Meet by Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein. They studied 379 low income 
single mothers, 214 receiving some assistance from the old welfare system (the 
study was done before the reform) and an additional 165 receiving no such aid 
but relying primarily on low-wage work. Of these women all but one relied on 
other sources of income besides either welfare or low-wage job.  
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So as things stood before welfare reform, neither low-wage work nor state 
assistance was enough to enable mothers to support their families. The changes 
made under TANF (five year term limit for aid, job as a condition of aid) 
therefore make mothers even more reliant on low-wage work. In 1996 there 
were over 4.43 million families receiving welfare assistance; by 2009 the 
number had dropped to 1.77 million (United States Bureau of the Census 2012, 
364). It is hard to know how much of this drop is a result of the change in the law 
(most people on welfare had always preferred to work and rarely stayed on 
welfare more than two to four years). Still, the decline gives a rough measure of 
how many have been forced into labor under whatever conditions they can get. 
More recent studies of the law’s effects confirm the extreme hardship and 
coercion of their labor for women who must care for children but lack adequate 
income to do so (Collins and Mayer 2010, Henrici 2006). 
This legal change has increased competition for low-wage jobs, making it 
even harder to improve wages and working conditions. Moreover, people who 
must work to survive, people whose back-up has been removed, can be used as 
strikebreakers when strikes occur. Perhaps more significant, because employed 
workers are aware of the existence of large numbers desperate for work, they 
are likely to be deterred from striking. Low-wage jobs characteristically have a 
high turnover, and the large number desperate for work can be used by 
employers to replace any workers who may show an inclination to organize 
collectively. In fact, in poultry processing and in border maquiladoras employers 
encourage or enforce short-term employment precisely to prevent organizing 
among workers (Stuesse 2016). So a large number desperate for work will have 
a depressive or ‘anchor’ effect on many other workers, limiting collective 
organization and struggle to improve wages and working conditions.  
These changes are a recreation of racial injustice. While the ratio of non-
Hispanic white people to black people in the U.S. population is 5.3 to 1 (there are 
5.3 times as many non-Hispanic white people as black in the U.S.), the ratio of 
white to black dependence on TANF is 1.7 to one (United States Census Bureau 
2012, 10, 353). So black families are 3.1 times more likely to be under the 
discipline of TANF than white families are, a very disparate racial impact.  
Undocumented Migration3  
In 1821 Mexico encompassed not only its current territory but up to the 42nd 
parallel in what is now the United States, including all of the territory of 
California, Nevada, Utah, part of Wyoming and Colorado, and all of the states of 
the Southwest. In the aftermath of the Mexican-American War of 1846-48, 
current borders were established, and this territory was conquered by or ceded 
to the United States. But the border between Mexico and the U.S. was unguarded; 
                                                        
3 This section is indebted for much of its information and analysis to Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz 
(2011, especially Chapter 2).  
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people migrated across it as they had for centuries, even millennia. As 
agriculture developed in California in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
big growers needed seasonal labor. They tried Chinese and Japanese workers, 
but eventually settled on Mexican (and, to a lesser extent, Filipino) labor because 
workers were more easily recruited (and then deported). (Still many did stay in 
the U.S. – perhaps a third of the million who came to labor in California in the 
1920s.) Douglas Massey and co-authors summarize the situation:  
With the sole exception of the 1930s, when the Great Depression effectively 
extinguished U.S. labor demand, politicians and public officials have 
persistently sought ways of accepting Mexicans as workers while limiting their 
claims as human beings. Only the formula by which this sleight of hand is 
achieved has changed over time… (Massey et al. 2002, 105).  
Starting early in the 20th century there was a kind of informal bracero 
program: workers were recruited when needed, deported when not. In 1942 the 
official bracero program began; it actually supplemented unofficial immigration, 
but many growers preferred that workers be registered with the government. So 
workers might be deported only to be immediately returned to the U.S. as 
registered braceros. From 1942 to 1964 there were 4.6 million worker entries 
from Mexico as braceros (4.6 million is the number of entries; since many 
workers came repeatedly, the number of actual workers was between one and 
two million). In some years the number who entered outside the program or any 
official channel of immigration (‘illegally’) probably far exceeded the number of 
braceros. After the end of the bracero program in 1964 Mexican workers 
continued to cross in order to work (mostly in California, but also in Chicago as 
well as Texas), often without documents. (Others entered with a temporary work 
visa or as legal permanent residents, the latter mostly through family members 
already in the U.S.) These undocumented workers worked alongside others in 
the fields. It is important to emphasize that through this period (and later) every 
effort to limit immigration was opposed by business interests dependent on 
immigrant labor and by politicians representing those interests.  
In 1965, as part of civil rights, national quotas were abolished that had 
been imposed by the Immigration Act of 1924 (national quotas from the Eastern 
Hemisphere based on the proportion of the U.S. population in 1890 who traced 
their origin to those countries, a policy based on arguments that people from 
southern and eastern Europe who immigrated between 1890 and 1920 were 
inferior to northern and western Europeans). In 1968 a cap of 120,000 on 
immigration from the Western Hemisphere was enforced for the first time. In 
1976 the 1965 law was amended to impose a limit of 20,000 from any single 
country from the Western Hemisphere (Massey et al. 2002, 43). So in eleven 
years legal immigration from Mexico went from being unlimited to being limited 
to 20,000. Later legislation further limited the total number of visas available.  
Into the 1970s and thereafter Mexican immigration is caused not only by 
job-pull but also by deprivation-push. In the 1970s economic stagnation, which 
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hit many world economies, including the U.S., hit Mexico. A series of devaluations 
of the Mexican peso, starting with a floating of the peso in 1976, then further 
devaluations in the 1980s and 1990s cut real wages for Mexican workers. A 
structural adjustment initiated by U.S. banks, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the World Bank, led to privatization of industries, elimination of trade 
barriers, and removal of supports for Mexican agriculture. Mexican grain 
markets were flooded with cheap U.S.-produced grain (cheap primarily because 
U.S. grain production is highly capital-intensive, but there was also dumping of 
surplus grain). By 1995 one-third of Mexico’s grain consumption was of grain 
imported from the U.S. (Currently the percentage is 35%.) Life in the countryside 
became untenable for millions of Mexican workers, who either moved to Mexico 
City (metro area population over 20,000,000) or other Mexican cities or left for 
work in the United States. U.S.-based businesses took advantage of these changes 
to move production to Mexico. The forcing of ‘excess’ agricultural workers out of 
the countryside (depeasantization) is occurring worldwide with unprecedented 
rapidity and magnitude, leading Mike Davis (2006) to call the Earth a “planet of 
slums.” It occurs regardless of whether there is opportunity in the cities; it 
becomes impossible to survive in rural areas. The migration of rural Mexican 
workers toward the cities in Mexico depressed wages there; urban workers who 
sought to maintain or improve their living standard moved to the U.S. for jobs: 
1.8 million during the 1980s, 4.9 million during the 1990s, and 4.4 million 
between 2000 and 2005. As the border became more heavily patrolled, workers 
stayed rather than return to Mexico. It was still possible to enter, but the 
expenses for a coyote were higher, the trip more dangerous.  
It is important to stress that in this context of increased immigration and a 
growing population of unauthorized immigrants, U.S. businesses adapted. The 
U.S. economy came to depend on undocumented labor; workers in the following 
categories were estimated to be more than 10% undocumented in 2008: 
landscaping (28%), household servants (23%), garment labor (23%), 
agricultural labor (20%), animal processing, various manufacturing labor, 
building maintenance (all 19%), bakery workers (not retail) (17%), car washes 
(17%), construction (14%), taxi and limousine drivers (14%), fruit and 
vegetable processing (13%), restaurants and other food services (12%) (Passel 
and Cohn 2009, 32).  
These numbers only begin to give a measure of the number of businesses, 
large and small, which depend on undocumented labor. As a corollary we can 
infer that thousands of businessmen will fight to hold on to this labor force, which 
works under the conditions offered, in fear of the actions of the state. These 
businessmen and politicians who represent them ensure that no law will 
effectively deprive them of this essential labor. Hence, the effect of the increased 
enforcement of the border and of various raids is never to rid the U.S. economy of 
this labor; it is to ensure that the labor is duly terrorized and pliable. In the 
words of Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz: “[T]he opening of borders to trade and finance, 
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accompanied by the ‘closing’ of borders to workers, has had the effect of 
illegalizing—but not stopping— transmigrant labor. …[B]order policies do not 
stop labor migration; rather they generate inequality by assigning illegal status 
to a segment of the global labor force” (Gomberg-Muñoz 2011, 34).  
Jeffrey Passel and D’Vera Cohn (2009) estimate that 5.4% of the U.S. labor 
force is undocumented, more than 8.25 million workers. Often unable to obtain 
drivers licenses, these workers are under constant threat of actions from the 
state; nearly 360,000 were deported annually 2008-2015 (United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2016). This creates a climate of fear for 
those workers which helps to make them workers without rights and a boon to 
thousands of capitalists, large and small, who employ them.  
How Mass Incarceration Creates Workers without Rights  
Group stereotypes change, but through the nineteenth century and well into the 
twentieth, black workers (and slaves before 1860) were stereotyped as pliable 
and willing workers for simple labor, much as Mexican immigrants are now. The 
stereotype was based on the racist oppression of black workers, who were 
lynched, beaten, or maimed if they rebelled; they were forced to work long and 
hard under conditions usually worse than those prevailing for white workers; 
when black workers were brought North to break strikes from the 1870s on, 
black people were stereotyped as a ‘scab race.’ Many socialists regarded black 
workers as unorganizable and as natural allies of the capitalists (other radicals, 
going back to the Knights of Labor in the 1870s and the IWW around the turn of 
the 20th century, united black and white in common struggle). During the 1930s, 
as union organizing efforts in the North (under communist influence) aimed to 
include black workers, the stereotype and the reality both changed, as black 
workers joined and often led the new industrial labor movement. To this day, 
black workers are union members at a higher rate than white. The civil rights 
struggles of the 1950s and 1960s – particularly black caucuses and other 
primarily black formations within industrial unions – put an end to the idea of 
the submissive and compliant black worker. But then who would play the role 
played historically by black labor? Who would work long and hard for low pay 
under whatever conditions were offered? Part of the answer, as we have seen, is 
undocumented immigrants and poor women (disproportionately black) who 
must support their children – vulnerable workers with few rights.  
But there is another part of the answer. Mass incarceration has 
transformed a large segment of the black male working class into workers 
without rights – at the same time it has done the same to a larger number who 
are not black. It is useful to see mass incarceration and its effects in the light of 
our prior discussion of undocumented immigrants.  
In 1925 the incarceration rate in state and federal prisons was 79 per 
100,000 U.S. residents or .079%; that represented a low point. Between that time 
and 1973 it fluctuated around a rate of 100, usually a little but not much more, 
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reaching a high of 137 in 1939; in the late sixties the rate fell into the 90s where 
it remained until 1973, when it was 96 (United States Bureau of Justice Statistics 
1982). Then it began a rise that accelerated in the 1980s and especially the 
1990s until in 2009 it was 502. This represents a 423% increase in the rate of 
incarceration over those 36 years. To put the point more graphically: to return to 
the 1973 rate of incarceration, four out of every five prisoners would have to be 
released from prison.4 If we add the people held in local jails, the total 
incarceration rate was 752 in 2009 (United States Census Bureau 2012, 218); no 
statistics going back to 1973 are kept for jails, but we can assume a similar rate 
of increase for jail populations. (Rates have dropped slightly since 2009.) How 
did this happen?  
The analysis I offer here follows in the footsteps of four writers, each of 
whom sees an important part of the answer: Elizabeth Hinton (2016), author of 
From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, Bruce Western (2006), author of 
Punishment and Inequality, Christian Parenti (1999), author of Lockdown 
America, and Michelle Alexander (2010), author of The New Jim Crow. Each 
traces important elements of the history, causes, and meaning of mass 
incarceration; yet each misses important parts of the story as well. Hinton puts 
the transition from social welfare solutions to punitive responses to urban black 
people in the context of the social history of black migration but, like Alexander, 
omits the relative decline of the U.S. as creating limits to ameliorative responses. 
Alexander follows Loїc Wacquant in divorcing mass incarceration from control 
of labor – a profound and important error. Western views the economic losses to 
prisoners as losses to the economy; he never considers whether they may serve 
the economy by creating vulnerable workers and a generalized climate of fear of 
the state. Parenti gives a helpful analysis of the social function of mass 
incarceration: while capitalism needs surplus workers to depress wages and 
control the employed, it controls these surplus workers through the system of 
mass incarceration. However, he then ignores that analysis in proposing 
decarceration (fewer in jail and prison, as Alexander recommends as well); he is 
silent on what an alternative to capitalist society would be. None shows how 
mass incarceration provides vulnerable workers for the low end of the labor 
market and creates a climate of terror which disciplines other workers. Because 
many young black men are in the penal system, that disciplining effect has a 
strong impact on the black working class generally.  
While, as I will argue, mass incarceration is functional, we still need to 
understand how it developed. Labor shortages in the North during World War I 
and then the increasing mechanization of southern agriculture and use of 
chemical herbicides were decreasing demand for black (and white) labor, 
leading many to migrate north and creating large segregated black 
neighborhoods in many cities. Hinton (2016) traces some early responses to this 
                                                        
4 Alexander (2010) puts the point in this way. 
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migration. Early in the Kennedy administration James B. Conant, Ralph McGill, 
and Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg were describing urban black youth without 
jobs as “social dynamite” and “potentially the most dangerous social condition in 
America today” (Hinton 2016, 29). Kennedy’s assault on juvenile delinquency 
focused on education and job training and evolved into expanded programs such 
as Head Start and Job Corps under Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty. These 
programs were grounded in a view of urban black people as ‘the other’ suffering 
from ‘social pathology; ’ black individuals needed to change, both in their skills 
and in their mindset, to take advantage of opportunities and become 
constructive citizens.  
But in 1964 first Harlem and then Rochester rose up in rebellion against 
the police; a year later Watts in Los Angeles witnessed the largest urban uprising 
in U.S. history (up to that point). Echoing the calls of conservatives for ‘law and 
order,’ Johnson launched the War on Crime with the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Act of 1965; it enabled police to penetrate more and more into black 
neighborhoods, often as providers of public services such as a recreation center 
with a pool table and library where cops would act as counselors to youth 
(Hinton 2016, 114). In Hinton’s words 
White House officials and Congress championed a law enforcement strategy 
that merged the War on Crime with the War on Poverty, forging a network of 
social service and surveillance programs that first emerged in [Kennedy’s] New 
Frontier under the umbrella of the Great Society. These urban interventions 
provided a foundation for the rise of the carceral state. (Hinton 2016, 61) 
With each rebellion, and even more when Detroit and Newark rose up in 
1967, the response of government officials became more punitive and less 
ameliorative. The institutional basis for mass incarceration, particularly of young 
black men, had been created even if it only came to fruition a few years later. 
While Hinton traces the influence of northern liberals on the rise of mass 
incarceration, Alexander looks at the influence of southern racists. In the 1950s 
and 1960s it became increasingly clear to southern segregationists that they 
could not hold on to their traditional ground; they retreated and regrouped; they 
shifted from defending ‘states’ rights’ and ‘tradition’ to calling for ‘law and order’ 
and condemning chaos and crime in the streets. Protest and urban uprisings 
were lumped with criminal behavior. The targets were black protestors and 
insurrectionists and white student radicals. This strategic retreat was successful 
and coincided with the shift of most southern white voters from the Democratic 
to the Republican Party.5 (From the time of Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican 
Party, the Democrats had been the main anti-black party in American electoral 
politics.) In his 1964 Republican presidential campaign Barry Goldwater 
                                                        
5 The point that southern segregationists prepared the political ground for mass incarceration 
is made most forcefully by Michelle Alexander, but parts of the same idea can be found in 
Robert Perkinson (2010, 9) and less explicitly in Bruce Western.  
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sounded the ‘law and order’ theme. Then Richard Nixon picked it up in 1968 and 
combined it with opposition to urban uprisings and student radicalism in his 
successful run for the presidency, despite segregationist George Wallace’s 
carrying five Deep South states; by 1972 Nixon won in a landslide, carrying the 
entire Deep South. His administrations were carrying out the ‘law and order’ 
program, developing laws that laid the basis for the growth in incarceration; 
Parenti explains, quoting Nixon advisor H. R. Haldeman: “‘[President Nixon] 
emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole problem is really the 
blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing to.’ 
That ‘system’ was the war on crime and the criminal justice buildup” (Parenti 
1999, 12). The calls for law and order became increasingly part of the American 
political mainstream, eventually embraced by the ‘new Democrats,’ as Clinton’s 
presidency put 100,000 more cops on the streets; mass incarceration grew more 
rapidly in Clinton’s term than before or since. Now Democrats such as former 
Obama chief of staff Rahm Emmanuel put the war on crime and gangs (black and 
latin youth) at the center of their appeal to voters.  
Western emphasizes not just the appeal of ‘law and order’ Republicans to 
the Deep South but also the shift of northern white Democratic voters to the 
Republicans based on their opposition to the northern civil rights struggles and 
urban uprisings. That certainly was an important factor in the Nixon, George H. 
W. Bush, and Reagan electoral victories. However, this analysis leaves out the 
stake that the elite, the capitalists, have in policy. Western’s model suggests that 
working class voters are driving policy. A more plausible view is that elites, 
through financial and institutional influence on the parties, formulate policy 
initiatives and persuade voters into the electoral channels that elites offer them. 
So by the time we are finished we need to understand what capitalist elites gain 
from mass incarceration.  
Western’s analysis of the evidence shows that there are three main causes 
of the growth of incarceration (2004, 50): first, increased use of prison (as 
opposed to alternatives, especially probation) as punishment; second, 
lengthening of prison sentences; third, more drug laws and more use of them as 
a ground of imprisonment (the War on Drugs). Mass incarceration has virtually 
no relation to increase in crime (and has caused little decline in crime) (Western 
2004, Chapter 7). Federal and state governments have adopted policies that have 
led to over seven million people in jail or prison or on probation or parole.  
Alexander details some of how this works, but many of us who live in or 
near all-black or mostly black neighborhoods can see it every day: young men 
assuming the position against a car or the side of a building. The phrase ‘driving 
while black’ (DWB) entered English as a name for a ‘crime.’ The Fourth 
Amendment was intended to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and 
seizure. However, the War on Drugs has essentially ended that protection, 
particularly for poor black people. It works like this: cars are stopped on a 
pretext of violating a minor traffic or other ordinance, for example, a broken or 
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missing taillight. (Such pretexts, driving a car with minor defects, are likely to be 
more common among people without much money; the stops are concentrated 
in poor black neighborhoods.) Now the officer requests permission to search the 
vehicle (looking for drugs). Most folks say ‘yes,’ fearing consequences if they say 
‘no.’6 The same sort of ‘consent search’ can occur – without the vehicle stop – on 
the sidewalk or on a bus: “May I speak with you?” says the officer; “Will you 
please put your hands up and lean against the wall?” he continues. Most do not 
realize that they are free to say ‘no;’ the Supreme Court has interpreted 
compliance with these ‘requests’ (which sound like commands) as consent.7 95%, 
sometimes 98% or more, of these searches find nothing. But if they search 
enough vehicles, it adds up to a lot of arrests; in the words of a California 
Highway Patrolman, ”You've got to kiss a lot of frogs before you find a prince" 
(Alexander 2010, 70).  
The racism comes partly in whom they choose to search. An Illinois study 
from 2007 shows that black drivers are three times as likely as whites to be 
searched by state police (Northwestern University Center for Public Safety 2007, 
10). (This leaves out the much more common searches by city cops in black 
neighborhoods.) The cause needn’t be racial animosity; more probably it is lack 
of social power. Cops are not likely to go looking for illegal drugs at a fraternity 
party at a large state university; sweeping up well connected students would be 
bad for police. When is the last time you saw a group of middleclass, middle-aged 
white women assuming the position while the police searched their vehicle for 
drugs? (And don’t tell me middle-class white folks don’t smoke weed.) So poor 
people, particularly poor black people, are the main victims.  
These and related practices which are part of the War on Drugs account 
for much of the growth in incarceration; other factors Western cites – more 
common use of prison as a sentence and longer sentences – are amplifications of 
the larger number swept into the system in these stops and searches. Parenti 
summarizes the racial injustice in this process: “[W]hile African Americans 
constitute only 13 percent of all monthly drug users, they represent 35 percent 
of all drug arrests, 55 percent of all drug convictions, and a staggering 74 percent 
of all drug prisoners” (Parenti 1999, 239). Most of the increase in prison 
population is related to drug offenses. The result, as we have seen, is 7.3 million 
in jail or prison or on probation or parole. Additionally probably twelve to 
thirteen million are ex-felons, convicted of a felony but no longer ‘in the system.’ 
Still, when they apply for a job, they have to ‘check the box:’ have you ever been 
convicted of a felony? Because anyone who hires them (McDonald’s will hire ex-
felons) is ‘doing them a favor,’ they too become workers without rights. Black 
                                                        
6 Empirical evidence indicates that very few people, particularly women and young people, feel 
free to decline to speak with police who ask to speak with them (Kessler 2009).  
7 These ways of phrasing the police questions are borrowed from Alexander (2010, 65-6), as is 
the point about consent not being real.  
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people are incarcerated at a rate five times that of whites; the ratio of black to 
white felony convictions is lower.  
This situation will not change soon. The acceleration of numbers in jail and 
prison has slowed, and there was even a decline from 2008 to 2009. I would not 
be surprised if there were further declines, but I would be surprised if they 
amounted to much. On the one hand, jails and prisons are a major taxpayer 
expense at a time of budget-cutting. On the other, they are central to the view of 
poor black people – especially male youth – as being a danger to social order, a 
view also adopted by many black people. Compared to the economic stagnation 
of the 1970s, the U.S. economy is doing better now that millions of workers lack 
rights, providing cheap, flexible, expendable labor throughout the economy.  
Mass incarceration creates five groups of workers without rights or with 
diminished rights: inmates who labor, people with jobs who are on work-release 
or in halfway houses, people on probation or parole, ex-felons (people with a 
felony conviction on their record), and the female partners or others who 
depend on men in the first four groups. Moreover, the involvement of so many 
young men in the system links mass incarceration to millions of families, 
especially black families.  
Here are the numbers: In 2009 there were 7.3 million directly in the 
system, 760,400 in jail, 1,524,513 in state or federal prisons, 4,203,967 on 
probation, and 819,308 on parole (United States Census Bureau 2012, 217). 
Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza, and Melissa Thompson (2006), using 
conservative demographic assumptions, estimated the 2004 ex-felon population 
at 11.7 million; presumably the number is now 12-13 million. Of adult males 
12.8% are either current or ex-felons; 33.4% of black adult males are either 
current or former felons. Those who are ex-felons are no longer under the direct 
control of the system but encounter a number of barriers; in the words of Uggen, 
Manza, and Thompson (2006: 284), “They typically confront legal restrictions on 
employment, access to public social benefits and public housing, and eligibility 
for educational benefits.” Many current or former felons enter the labor market 
as workers with diminished rights. Forty jurisdictions (out of the fifty states plus 
the District of Columbia) require parolees to seek employment, and similar 
requirements are made of probationers (Alexander 2010, 145). So if we add the 
five million on probation or parole to the more than twelve million who are ex-
felons, we probably have at least seventeen million, mostly males, who enter the 
labor market without rights or with diminished rights.  
The stereotype is that black males, particularly young ones, do not work, 
but while unemployment is high, many are working, at least part time. While to 
my knowledge reliable data about labor market participation are not available 
for ex-felons, as recently as 1997 56% of prisoners had a full-time job at the time 
they were arrested (Uggen et al. 2006: 295). If we keep in mind that many also 
work part-time, we can see that, even if people cannot make ends meet with a 
part-time low wage job (or even a full-time one) and hence are likely to 
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supplement legal income with extralegal income, they are, many of them, in the 
labor force in some way. If this is true generally, then it is true also for the 17 
million who are either on probation or parole (most likely high labor market 
participation) or are ex-felons (lower labor market participation), and it is true 
for black and latino as well as white. These are particularly vulnerable workers, 
with very diminished rights, who often work the lowest wage jobs, some off the 
books. People working these jobs are especially common in black neighborhoods, 
where the stigma of race amplifies that of felon. We should not underestimate 
the effect of race even apart from a criminal record: in a low-wage labor market 
black job applicants with a clean record were no more likely to be called back or 
offered a job than white applicants who were just released from prison (Pager et 
al. 2009). So while, for a white candidate, a prison term cut their chances in half, 
so did being black rather than white. In Pager’s Milwaukee study a prison record 
cut a black applicant’s chances of getting a further interview or offer by another 
two-thirds; this is the equivalent to one-sixth the chance of a white worker with 
a clean record (Pager 2007, 70). 
The harms of mass incarceration are not limited to people who are caught 
directly in its web. To understand its broader social meaning we should 
understand its relation to what Karl Marx called capitalism’s “relative surplus 
population” (1976, 781 ff.). With the growing mechanization of southern 
plantation agriculture (beginning in the late 1930s) southern black agricultural 
workers became surplus and migrated to southern and northern cities to work 
in factories and elsewhere. This worked well during the labor shortages created 
by World War II and, briefly, during the expansion of the Vietnam War in the 
mid-60s. As we entered the 1970s black tenant farmers and sharecroppers had 
been decimated, dropping from 704,000 in 1920 to 82,000 in 1964 (Groh 1972, 
33). (There was a similar, though slightly less dramatic, decline in white tenants 
and sharecroppers.)  
However, after the brief post World War II period of prosperity (and 
diminished international competition), U.S. industry begins a rapid decline 
(relative to growing industries in other countries) in the 1970s. Capitalists 
responded by abandoning much of urban industrial production (where unions 
often had a foothold and wages were relatively high) in favor of small towns and 
the South – where unions were weak and workers desperate – or in favor of 
shipping production overseas (now all televisions are produced outside the U.S.). 
Black urban workers were caught in the permanent crisis of stagnation of the 
1970s and thereafter. Mass incarceration was the method by which the 
unemployed section of this group was controlled.  
This control also disciplined the remaining workers. In Capital Marx wrote, 
“The overwork of the employed part of the working class swells the ranks of its 
reserve, while, conversely, the greater pressure that the reserve by its 
competition exerts on the employed workers forces them to submit to over-work 
and subjects them to the dictates of capital.” (1976, 789). I follow Marx in seeing 
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labor’s reserve army as disciplining employed workers, but I add that 
incarceration of masses of young black male workers increases the terror felt 
generally in black neighborhoods and reminds employed black workers of the 
consequences of deviation from capitalist order.  
Despite high unemployment and high incarceration, black workers are 
central to the workings of the U.S. economy, to our health care system, letter and 
package sorting and delivery, and urban transit, among other essential tasks. The 
Statistical Abstract of the United States for 2012 shows that black workers 
(10.8% of the labor force) were disproportionately represented in the following 
occupations (percentage of the workers in that occupation that is black is given 
after that occupation): pre-school and kindergarten teachers (13.4), teacher 
assistants (12.7), clinical laboratory technologists and technicians (15.1), health 
diagnosing and treating practitioner support technicians (13.6), licensed 
practical and licensed vocational nurses (24.4), medical records and health 
information technicians (19.9), nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 
(34.6), bailiffs, correctional officers, and jailers (22), security guards and gaming 
surveillance officers (28.8), cooks (15), food preparation workers (13.4), non-
restaurant food servers (18.6), janitors and building cleaners (17.1), maids and 
housekeeping cleaners (16.3), barbers (37.2), baggage porters, bellhops, and 
concierges (29.8), transportation attendants (12.2), child care workers (16), 
personal and home care aides (23.8), cashiers (16.1), telemarketers (25), bill and 
account collectors (17.5), billing and posting clerks and machine operators 
(13.7), customer service representatives (17.5), file clerks (16), interviewers 
(except eligibility and loan) (17.3), reservation and transportation ticket agents 
and travel clerks (24), couriers and messengers (15.4), postal service clerks 
(29.5), mail carriers (11.7), mail processors, sorters, and processing machine 
operators (30.5), stock clerks and order fillers (16.7), word processors and 
typists (12.3), non-postal service mail clerks and mail machine operators (21.4), 
butchers and other meat, poultry, and fish processing workers (14), laundry and 
dry cleaning workers (15.9), packaging and filling machine operators and 
tenders (16.4), bus drivers (25.1), taxi drivers and chauffeurs (26.6), and 
industrial truck and tractor operators (22). I left out many occupations where 
black workers are not disproportionately represented and many more where 
they were slightly disproportionately represented (15% or less). And I did not 
mention the professions, such as social worker, where black people are also 
disproportionately represented (22.9%) (United States Bureau of the Census 
2012, 393-96). The point of the long list of occupations is that, while schools 
which are disproportionately black usually do not prepare black children for 
more challenging and interesting work that carries social prestige, nevertheless 
many children are being socialized for essential but low-status jobs – repeating 
the long history of racial injustice.  
These facts about the role of black labor in the U.S. economy, the analysis 
of the role of the most vulnerable low-wage workers in disciplining other 
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workers (vulnerability being created by both race and the discipline and stigma 
of the penal system), and the climate of fear created by mass incarceration, a 
climate which further disciplines other workers, particularly black workers, 
rebut Alexander’s denial that mass incarceration helps to control labor. She cites 
Loїc Wacquant: “He emphasizes that the one thing that makes the current penal 
apparatus strikingly different from the previous racial caste systems is that ‘it 
does not carry out the positive economic mission of recruitment and discipline of 
the workforce.’… [Mass incarceration] views African Americans as largely 
irrelevant and unnecessary to the newly structured economy – an economy that 
is no longer driven by unskilled labor.” (Alexander 2010, 207) This common 
view is exactly wrong.  
“But, Paul, if, as you claim, mass incarceration is functional for the 
capitalists, why is the unemployment rate for black ex-felons so high (as the 
evidence about discrimination seems to indicate it would be)? Why don’t the 
capitalists just hire them?” These questions display a misunderstanding of the 
ways in which mass incarceration and criminalization are functional. Remember, 
in response to the economic problems of the 1970s, a number of changes 
occurred – slowing the economy, increasing unemployment, exporting jobs from 
the heavily-union central cities of the North and Midwest to small towns, right-
to-work states, the South, and out-of-country, breaking unions, structural 
adjustments, free-trade zones, and grain-dumping in Mexico – that had the effect 
of creating a relative surplus population to discipline employed workers. The 
rise of mass incarceration should be seen in that context. Like the other changes 
we have reviewed, it created a climate of terror, an awareness of vulnerability. 
So there are the workers under the discipline or stigma of the penal system who 
are directly in the formal economy but as workers with diminished rights (white 
felons or ex-felons would likely be represented at a greater proportion than 
other felons or ex-felons). In addition, there are millions in the informal economy 
or with one leg in the formal and another in the informal economy. This mass of 
hyper-vulnerable workers disciplines the other workers in the formal economy: 
go to work, do as you’re told, keep your mouth shut, don’t make trouble. Millions 
of black families are reminded regularly – by visits to or letters to or from 
carceral institutions or letters from parole or probation officers – of the dangers 
of non-conformity. 
Cheap Food, Cheap Chicken  
We need to draw together several threads. Black labor was central to the 
development of the United States as a world power in the nineteenth century, 
providing the largest export crop, cotton. In the late nineteenth century and the 
first half of the twentieth black (and considerable white) labor continued to 
create wealth in plantation crops of cotton, rice, and sugar as well as in mining, 
meatpacking, food crop harvesting and processing, and basic industry. Black 
workers were demeaned and vulnerable; they worked for lower wages and in 
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worse conditions than other workers. Their vulnerability limited what white 
workers working alongside them were able to gain.  
From the 1940s through the 1970s two things happened: first, black 
people insisted on the same rights as others, declaring their unwillingness to be 
demeaned and vulnerable; second, as the stagflation of the ‘70s developed, it 
became clear that the U. S. was declining economically relative to Japan and 
Europe, as well as new rising economies in Asia and Latin America. The 
capitalists’ response to the crisis was to weaken the position of workers, 
lowering wages, and attacking unions. But now it was harder to use black 
workers – disproportionately unionized – to undermine the position of other 
workers (although black youth were used as strikebreakers in that period). New 
sources of vulnerable labor were needed.  
The three changes we reviewed in this essay were the main sources of 
new groups of workers without rights: the curtailment of welfare, the rise of 
mass incarceration and criminalization, and the huge increase in workers 
classified as ‘illegal.’ Together these changes provided, I have argued, new 
vulnerable workers with few or no rights, particularly exposed to hostile actions 
of the state. These workers serve two functions in the capitalist economy: they 
provide low-wage, flexible labor, and they act as an anchor, undermining what 
other workers can achieve (particularly in the context of high unemployment 
and absence of labor unions). 
This section is about cheap food, particularly cheap chicken. Cheap food is 
central to how social control works. Many of us do not like our jobs. But we 
console ourselves at the mall (or on the internet), buying smart phones, flat 
panel television sets, computer games, Ipads, and other electronic wizardry. It 
keeps us under control. But many who buy this stuff are far from affluent: how 
can we afford it? We don’t pay much for food.8 The cheapness of food is the key 
to social control.  
In 1929 people in the U.S. spent 23.4% of their disposable income on food. 
While the percentage rose slightly in the early 1930s, it declined steadily ever 
since; by 2014 9.7% of disposable income went for food (5.5% at home; 4.3% 
away from home [rounding presumably explains apparent discrepancy with 
total share for food]) (United States Department of Agriculture 2016a). In the 
United States people spend less of their income on food than in other countries. 
Comparing budgets for eating at home in 2015, in the U.S. the figure is 6.4% for 
food and non-alcoholic beverages, the lowest percentage in the world; here are 
the 2015 percentages for other industrialized or industrializing countries: U.K. 
8.2%, Germany 10.3%, France 13.2%, Japan 14.2%, Mexico 23.1%, Brazil 15.5%, 
Russia 28%, India 30.5%, and China 25% (United States Department of 
Agriculture 2016b). While these figures may exaggerate the U.S. advantage in 
cheap food, the point still remains that food is cheap in the U.S. compared with 
                                                        
8 And the workers who make the electronics receive low wages. 
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other countries.9 When people have to spend less of their budgets on food, this 
leaves more money for other stuff. So in the United States even non-affluent 
people may have a smart phone or flat screen television.  
Cheap chicken is a central cheap food. In the U.S. per capita consumption 
of chicken is roughly 80 pounds per year, turkey roughly 20 pounds per year; 
more chicken is consumed than either beef or pork. Chicken consumption has 
been rising since the 1930s while beef consumption had declined since the mid-
1980s. The four largest producers of chickens control nearly 60% of the market. 
Roughly a half million workers are employed in meat slaughtering and 
processing (including poultry), but less than 3% are covered by a union contract; 
the real wages of workers have declined since 1976. Turnover rates are high, in 
some plants as high as 400% per year; the lowest estimate of turnover is 40% 
annually (Kandel 2009).  
Employers seem to encourage high turnover to prevent unionization. In 
her study of central Mississippi poultry workers, Angela Stuesse (2016) was told 
by union members that the new hires from the area replacing undocumented 
workers were unlikely to stay. “When I asked [union steward Patrick] Herring if 
this would be a problem for Tyson, he shrugged, ‘No. They’ll just replace ‘em. 
That’s what they want!’ Indeed, high rates of attrition do much more damage to 
organizing efforts than to company profits, and, as illustrated [earlier], the 
industry has adapted its production process to accommodate extreme worker 
turnover.” (Stuesse 2016, 183)  
Mississippi has 25,000 workers in the poultry industry, concentrated in 
central Mississippi, where three of the top five chicken producers (Tyson [1], 
Sanderson Farms [4], and Koch Foods [5]) all have plants. There are a few white 
workers left in the industry; it relies primarily on black and undocumented labor. 
Black labor is likely to be particularly vulnerable in this area, partly because of 
the tradition of intense segregation and subordination of black people in 
Mississippi and partly for reasons I have suggested here: Mississippi has the 
second highest (to Louisiana) rate of incarceration in the U. S. leaving many black 
women without male family members to help support themselves and their 
children, and many men doubly stigmatized as black and ex-felon. Poultry 
producers particularly like undocumented labor. In fact, as black workers 
                                                        
9 Two qualifications are necessary: first, poor people spend more of the budgets on food; so 
countries with many people who have little money, such as China and India, will spend more 
of their disposable income on food. Second, because, within countries, poor people spend a 
higher percentage of their budgets on food than wealthy people do, countries with more 
wealth inequality (such as the United States compared with Japan) can be misleading as to 
how much money the typical family may spend on food; if there are large numbers of very 
wealthy who spend small percentages of their income on food, this can obscure the situation 
of the typical (median) family which may spend a higher percentage on food than the average 
of everyone lumped together. I am unable to get percentages of the median budget 
expenditures on food, which would tell us more about what percentage an average person 
would spend.  
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organized unions in both poultry processing and catfish farming and processing, 
capitalists turned to undocumented workers to lower wages and reduce worker 
prerogatives. Cuban workers, who had legal residency, had a broader range of 
job prospects and would not stay in Mississippi poultry (Stuesse 2008, 148); as a 
worker put it, “Well, a Cuban, with legal papers, can choose any kind of work.” 
(Stuesse 2008, 149) When two Cuban workers filed discrimination complaint 
that they were not hired because they were documented, the U. S. Department of 
Justice would not pursue the claims because being documented was not a 
protected category. (Stuesse 2008, 237) 
Not only do many white workers harbor anti-black stereotypes which 
serve to divide poultry workers, but black and undocumented workers are also 
divided. Stuesse found that undocumented workers quickly accepted racist 
stereotypes that black people did not want to work. For their part, black workers 
harbored resentment of undocumented workers for undermining the rights that 
black workers had won: some black workers had engaged in union organizing 
and other resistance to management, even sometimes sabotaging production 
(someone threw soap in the water used to chill the chickens [Stuesse 2016, 124] 
in order to gain some respite from the unrelenting speed of the work); black 
workers may demand workers’ compensation when they can’t work because of 
injury while undocumented workers may keep working until the pain forces 
them out. Black workers can view undocumented workers as undermining the 
gains they have achieved, one worker explaining, “They’re not taking our jobs, 
but they is working non-stop, raising expectations. …Sometime they be there, 
like, a couple of days and stuff, like from one shift to the other one, without even 
going home (Stuesse 2008, 281). Another worker said: 
Well, we got some power now. And then [Hispanic workers] comes in… And 
they say, ‘Okay, I’ll do that.’ And so then you say, ‘Well, wait a minute, you know, 
we’re using that as a leverage to get up the ladder further.’ …And the white 
people turn around and say, ‘Well, hey, I ain’t got to pay. I ain’t got to do this or 
that, you know, because I can get him to do it.’ And there goes your power, right 
out the window. So I think that’s where a lot of the hostility’s coming from. 
(Stuesse 2008, 281)  
So black workers see themselves as having gained some rights that are 
eroded by the presence of undocumented workers. But the other side of the coin 
is that undocumented workers, cultivating the self-stereotype as willing workers, 
can see the anti-management militancy of black workers as confirming anti-
black stereotypes of being lazy and not wanting to work.  
The growing presence of undocumented workers in the industry has been 
used by management to depress wages and undermine working conditions, 
which can be brutal. Line speeds require workers in deboning to perform 20,000 
motions per shift. Repetitive stress injuries are common, turnover high. 
Management uses company doctors who routinely misdiagnose or minimize 
injuries; management will tell injured workers to stay in the plant, even doing 
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nothing, rather than sending them home, which would require an injury report. 
So injuries are greatly underreported (Stuesse 2008, 250-261). To indicate some 
of the extent and effect of injuries I quote a paragraph from Stuesse:  
Three union representatives that work in poultry plants throughout the South 
commented to me on separate occasions about the industry’s crippling effects 
on entire communities. ‘When they are done with you, they’ll crumple you up 
like a piece of paper and throw you out and reach back for your kids,’ one 
observed. Another spoke [of] a town full of African American families with 
‘three generations of cripples,’ all of whom had worked in poultry. She went on 
to posit that one reason the Latin American population is growing in chicken 
plants is because ‘they’ve crippled all the African American workers.’ Still 
another organizer was telling me about the difficulties of doing worker 
outreach in the Black community with ‘so many people [who were] broke up 
and cut up and bashed up and didn’t get a penny out of ‘em. You ought to see 
[some of the] houses they was living in.’ (Stuesse 2008, 265)  
Since workers – particularly the undocumented – are often fired for 
getting injured, Bureau of Labor Statistics reports of declining injuries should be 
regarded instead as reflecting the growth of undocumented labor (Stuesse 2008, 
263). Management’s approach to the brutality of the work is to insure an 
oversupply of workers (relatively easy, given depeasantization and a worldwide 
skyrocketing of relative surplus population), treat them as disposable, and 
simply replace injured workers with new ones. If they can retain a high enough 
percentage of the most vulnerable workers, they can also avoid workers’ 
compensation claims.  
The divisions between vulnerable workers – black and undocumented – 
have undercut union organizing in the central Mississippi area, lowered wages, 
and sped up the pace of work. Central Mississippi is representative of wages and 
working conditions throughout the southern-based poultry processing industry. 
This is why chicken is cheap.  
If chicken is the extreme case, it is not atypical in food processing. In a 
2006 Chicago Tribune article Dawn Turner Trice described the vicious conditions 
endured by Mississippi Delta catfish workers, mostly black women, such as 
timed bathroom breaks in bathrooms whose stalls lacked doors and sexual 
harassment. The workers had formed a union twenty-five years ago that won 
some rights, but the subsequent importation of undocumented workers 
undermined the gains workers had achieved (Trice 2006).  
Beef and pork processing traced an arc from the brutal conditions at the 
beginning of the twentieth century (portrayed in Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle) 
through the CIO period of the 1930s-60s that transformed meatpacking into a 
relatively decent working class job at union wages (Halpern 1997; Horowitz 
1997), then to its current descent into conditions which are, arguably, as bad as 
ever. Under the innovation of Iowa Beef Packers and then later Cargill and 
ConAgra, beef and pork processing moved from the unionized urban centers of 
Chicago, Kansas City, and St. Paul to small towns in right-to-work states where 
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unions were weak – in areas closer to cattle feed lots. Huge packing plants 
opened; workers are being drawn from the world’s displaced peasants 
(including failed U. S. farmers) into work at a blistering pace that reduced living 
mammals into the small pieces we see in the supermarket. Bodies wear out from 
the frenetic pace, long hours, forced overtime, six and even seven day weeks 
(Human Rights Watch 2004, Horowitz 1997). But workers are easily replaced.  
Stoop labor harvesting crops is notoriously difficult. When Georgia 
enacted legislation prescribing harsh penalties for using fake identification 
documents to get jobs and empowering police to interrogate criminal suspects 
about their immigration status, growers could not find workers to pick their 
crops. The state government tried to use unemployed people on criminal 
probation as farm workers, but the probationers did not relish stooping to pick 
cucumbers for long hours in the hot sun (Brumbach and Henry 2011). Fruit and 
vegetable processing is not much easier. As a college student in California, I 
heard stories of the difficult labor in the canneries (which some students took to 
earn money during the summer). If the processing of fruit and vegetables lacks 
the horror of slaughtering animals who resist dying, it can be fast-paced and 
repetitive, leading to repetitive stress injuries. If changes in meat and poultry 
processing are indicative, conditions in other food processing have also 
deteriorated.  
Who are the workers in these industries? Certainly undocumented and 
likely many who are ineligible for government support under TANF and people 
who are either on probation or parole or are stigmatized by a felony conviction 
(no one seems to collect this information). Management uses vulnerable labor to 
depress wages and working conditions in agricultural labor and meat, poultry, 
and other food processing. Depressed wages and brutal working conditions 
make food cheap. Cheap food makes it possible for the rest of us to buy the toys 
that we use to console us for work that lacks joy and to try to give our lives an 
empty meaning. These toys are part of what keeps the rest of us under control.  
How Racial Injustice Divides the Working Class—and What Must Be Done  
In the central Mississippi area that Stuesse (2008, 2016) studied workers had 
long been deeply divided by race; as I have argued, the extra exploitation and 
oppression of black workers in this region helps to understand why white 
workers there are, by national standards, badly off. This racial inequality and 
division affected workers in the poultry processing industry Stuesse studied. One 
worker reported that in the 1950s, when black workers were excluded at 
Southeastern Packers in Forest, Mississippi, a walk-out by poultry workers led 
the bosses to bring in black workers (Stuesse 2008, 113). Then in the 1970s, 
when the labor force at Southwestern was 80% black, a union was certified and 
workers struck (the white workers did not go out); white strikebreakers were 
brought in.  
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The depth of racial inequality and consequent salience of race in this 
region means that workers are not conscious of themselves as a class. Still 
central Mississippi – while at the racist end of the spectrum – tells us what race 
means.  
Real material inequality in workers’ income, wealth, and working 
conditions enhances social control in two ways. First, as I just explained, the 
brutal superexploitation of workers in agriculture and food processing makes 
cheap food possible; cheap food means that more affluent workers have money 
for consumer goods such as electronic toys, which divert and amuse us. Second, 
material inequality among workers causes us to compare our condition to others 
more like us, rather than to the capitalist owners of the plants. These 
comparisons lead to two common responses: more advantaged workers are 
contemptuous of those who are worse off, blaming their condition on their 
perceived faults and failings (this is classical racist psychology); those who are 
worse off direct their anger and resentment at better off workers, whose 
contempt they often feel (Gomberg 2007, Chapter 8). These attitudes divide the 
working class. The capitalist gets off the hook.  
Students of racial injustice often make one of two related errors. Seeing 
the brutal inequality of racial injustice, some lose sight of the common 
exploitation workers experience. (Stuesse [2008, 2016], for example, is clear 
about the different but real disadvantages that black and undocumented 
workers experience, but for her white workers are invisible and make virtually 
no appearance in her ethnography.) Alternatively, ‘class unity’ analysts see the 
common exploitation but minimize the brutal inequality that is racial injustice. 
We must fight both common exploitation and its brutal inequality. Only fighting 
the two together can unite workers in common struggle (Goldfield 1997). Unity is 
possible once we acknowledge both the brutality of racial injustice and how 
racism limits what is possible for better-off workers.  
But for what should we fight? Every struggle against racial injustice in 
United States history has led to its elimination or modification in that particular 
form and to its re-creation in a new form. Why? I have argued that racist 
oppression of black and other workers is functional in the capitalist economy, 
providing workers with diminished rights desperate for work; this relative 
surplus population is the most deprived tier of workers and the unemployed, 
acting as an anchor and a disciplining force on other workers. This relative 
surplus population, organized through categories of race or allied categories, is 
favorable to profits for capitalists. Because racial injustice serves an economic 
function for capitalists, it is re-created in new forms. Here I have told the story of 
the most recent replacement. The end of racial injustice in all forms whatsoever 
will require the end of capitalism. What will replace capitalism? I have begun to 
sketch an alternative (Gomberg 2007, 2016; cf. Progressive Labor Party 1982): a 
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